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[VOL. 43 eurocurrency deposits unique and different from the ordinary bankercustomer relationship. They further argue that, because eurobanks are located in the jurisdiction or territory of another sovereign, there are additional considerations such as the expectation of the parties, in relation to the nature of the allocation of sovereign risk, which do not arise in the same manner in domestic banking. This makes the common law rules inadequate as a legal regime for the operation of eurocurrency deposits. This article supports this latter argument and advocates the creation of an international legal regime to govern the operation of eurocurrency deposits and interbank placements.
III. THE NATURE OF A EUROCURRENCY DEPOSIT TRANSACTION
A typical eurocurrency deposit transaction could take place in the following manner. We assume the existence of a country called "Arabina", located somewhere in Eastern Europe, with a central bank called the Arabina National Bank (ANB). ANB has its head office in Arabina. draft, it is usual for the transfer of funds to be effected by way of debit and credit entries to accounts which both Citizens Bank (US) and National Bank (US) maintain with the Federal Reserve. To effect the transfer to National Bank (UK), National Bank (US) will credit the "vostro" or due-to account of National Bank (UK) and will then transmit a message to National Bank (UK) via SWIFT,6 instructing National Bank (UK) to credit the account of ANB with the amount of US$8 million. National Bank (UK) will thus enter a credit in favour of ANB and a credit in its own "nostro" or due-from account. Although this process is referred to as a funds transfer, no physical transfer of money actually takes place. Transfers are effected solely in the form of credit entries. Since no money is actually transferred during this whole process, the book entries made in the United Kingdom only reflect the entries made in the books of the two US banks and are sometimes referred to as mirror accounts or entries.7 Thus by giving up its claim against Citizens Bank (US), ANB now acquires a claim against National Bank (UK) for the amount of US$8 million.
ANB also maintains an account with "Citizens Bank (US)", located in New York. ANB receives into its account with Citizens Bank (US) payments in US dollars for the sale of its natural resources. The current balance of ANB's account with Citizens Bank (US) stands at US$10 million. We also assume that the government and monetary officials of Arabina decide that instead of letting the funds sit idle in Citizens Bank

A. The Process of Repayment
When a eurobank accepts a deposit denominated in the currency of another country, it undertakes certain obligations, including the obligation to repay, which is, in most cases, carried out by causing acts which take place in the country of issue of the currency concerned. This is because, as a general rule, most payment obligations involving the delivery and collection of eurocurrency take place in the country of issue according to the rules of its clearing system. In the scenario used above, then, the repayment obligation of National Bank (UK) will in most instances be performed in the United States by the delivery and collection of dollars in National Bank (US) or another bank in the United States nominated by the customer, ANB. This is not to say that it is not possible for payments to be effected without going through the clearing and payment system of the country of issue. As Professor Hal Scott argues, it is possible for payments to be made via "in-house" and correspondent bank transfers and in that manner avoid the clearing and settlement system of the country of issue.8 But the issue is not whether this is possible, but whether it is so usually used that it justifies an assertion that it is an implied term of the eurocurrency deposit contract that such a method of payment be used.9 It is the position of this article that, given the prevalent practice, it is possible to argue that it is an implied term of the contract that payments are to be made via the clearing and settlement system of the country of issue."1 This system of effecting payments is also dictated by practical considerations. Only a globally organised system for clearing and netting large sums in a variety of currencies will lead to an efficient functioning of the repayments process." Since no such organisation exists, all payments of eurocurrency have to go through the only systems which currently possess the facilities for collecting and netting large sums of foreign currency: the clearing systems of the countries of issue. 12 This is purely practical, given that central banks of the countries of issue of various major currencies are the only ones which will accept the responsibility for supplying unlimited quantities of that currency and that these central banks are committed to only their own clearing banks.'" Furthermore, eurocurrency deposits are denominated in eurocurrency, that is, eurodollars, eurosterling and the like and not dollars or sterling per se. "' Consequently, repayment cannot be made in eurodollars or eurosterling, because they are only book entries, or what some commentators have referred to as quasi-money. 1 Being eurocurrencies payment cannot be made at arm's length and so eurocurrencies have to be converted into their corresponding currencies before repayment can be made. The process of converting the quasi-money, that is, eurocurrencies into their corresponding currencies generally takes place in the country of issue of the currency concerned. This is because there is no international body which can supply the needed funds in the various currencies. In the absence of an international organisation which is both willing to supply, and capable of supplying, unlimited quantities of a variety of currencies on demand, the only efficient alternative is to repay a deposit denom- Moreover, effecting payment via the clearing and settlement system of a country of issue of a particular currency provides the speed, certainty and efficiency associated with a net-net settlement process, which is generally not available when payment is effected via correspondent or "in-house" transfers.'7 Unlike the domestic banking context then, in the eurocurrency deposit context, it is possible to identify three stages in the repayment process:
(1) the demand for payment by the customer; (2) the preparation by the customer's bank to effect payment; and (3) actual payment: the collection of funds. While all three stages may take place in the same bank in the domestic context, only the first two stages take place at the eurobank in the eurocurrency deposit context.
IV. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE COMMON LAW REGIME
THE application of the common law rules concerning the operation of domestic bank deposits to the operation of eurocurrency deposits gives rise to various grey areas. These arise because of the inadequacy of the common law rules concerning the operation of bank deposits, when they are applied to the operation of offshore currency deposits in general and eurocurrency deposits in particular. The grey areas which will be discussed in this article are:
(1) the concept of payment in eurocurrency deposit operations, including the definition of what constitutes money and payment, as well as the place and time of payment in eurocurrency deposit operations; (2) the method of determining the proper law of a eurocurrency deposit contract; (3) the jurisdictional conflicts which arise in the operation of eurocurrency deposits in particular; and (4) the legal effect of the imposition of restraints on the operation of offshore banks. This grey area includes the determination of when the home office of an offshore branch bank will be held liable for deposits held at the offshore branch.
In discussing these grey areas, this article will argue that the inadequacy of the common law rules concerning the operation of bank deposits, for eurocurrency deposits, justifies the need for a new legal regime-an Under the common law, in the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, the promise of a bank to repay the deposit of a customer is to do so at the branch where the account is kept, that is, the place where the deposit is maintained.23 In the case of an offshore currency deposit, this would be the country in which the bank is located.24 Although the reason for localising the repayment obligation of the bank is not clear, some commentators have argued that it may be based on the principle of corporate responsibility.25 This article contends that although there may be an element of truth in the assertion above, the localisation of the repayment obligation of banks is due to the nature of the evolution of money and the consequent legal definition of money. Since money is considered to be a chattel, that is, cash, and a bank deposit is identifiable as cash, the common law perceives a bank deposit to be something which is kept in a definite and identifiable location.26 The term "deposit", itself from the Latin "depositum", suggests the possession of certain physical attributes associated with locality. In the common law rules concerning the operation of bank deposits, then, there is a logical link between the place where the deposit is made and the place of repayment of such a deposit. This common law rule linking the place of repayment of a deposit to the place where the deposit is maintained gives rise to problems when applied to the repayment of a eurocurrency deposit. As the previous section observed, as a general rule, the repayment of a eurocurrency deposit does not occur at the place where the deposit is maintained, that is, the country in which the eurobank is located. In most cases the repayments of eurocurrency deposits take place in the countries of issue of the respective currencies, in accordance with those countries' clearing and settlement rules. As mentioned earlier, this usual practice is due to purely practical considerations and does not preclude the possibility of the repayment of a eurocurrency deposit being effected via correspondent or "in-house" transfers as contended by some writers. What the above suggests is that the common law rule with respect to the place of repayment of bank deposits is inapplicable to the repayment of eurocurrency deposits, because the place where a eurocurrency deposit or account may be maintained is not necessarily the place where repayment of the eurocurrency deposit takes place. As observed above, then, the process of repaying bank deposits may be divided into three stages: the demand by the customer at the bank where the account or deposit is maintained to be repaid; the preparation of the bank where the account is kept to repay the deposit; and the actual payment or delivery of the funds. While all three stages may take place at the same bank where the deposit or account is kept, in a domestic deposit context, this is not so with the repayment of eurocurrency deposits. In the latter case only the first two stages take place where the account is kept. The actual payment or delivery of the funds, whether in the form of clearing house funds, cash or other representative forms of cash, takes place-in most instances-in the country of issue of the currency. This suggests that the second stage (the preparation of the bank where the deposit is maintained to make payment, after it is demanded by the customer) does not constitute payment.
For a comprehensive and current discussion on the law of electronic funds transfers, see Benjamin Geva, The Law of Electronic Funds Transfers (1992).
30. Goode, op. cit. supra n.9, at p.81. It has been argued that since the very act of transmitting a payment message by a transmitting or originating bank, to a receiving bank, operates to produce payment, it is incorrect to assert that repayment of a eurocurrency deposit takes place in the country of issue. However, this argument, which is based on the process of credit transfers in the domestic context, does not seem applicable in the international context and also raises the issue of the time of the completion of payment in international funds transfers. One way of resolving this problem would be to draw a distinction between, on the one hand, the process of payment and, on the other, the actual collection or delivery of the funds. This distinction was drawn in the Wells Fargo litigation.3 However, since cover has to be provided by the sending or originating bank before a receiving or beneficiary bank is capable of effecting payment to the payee, the mere transmission of the payment message by the sending or originating bank, upon a demand by the payer-customer, cannot constitute payment. Furthermore, it seems inconceivable that the mere transmission of a payment order, upon a demand by the customer, should constitute payment in the absence of an acceptance by the receiving or beneficiary bank or of any other action on the part of the receiving/beneficiary bank which suggests that it has accepted the payment order for the benefit of the payee.
The argument that payment takes place where the eurobank is located, upon the transmission of the payment order of the payer-debtor, is flawed also in another sense. It fails to recognise that, irrespective of the transmission of a payment message, payment cannot be said to have taken place unless the funds transfer effectively constitutes the creditor's bank a debtor to the payee for the relevant sum payable.32 In this respect, it is not incorrect to regard payment as taking place in the country of issue.
In addition to redefining the place of repayment of eurocurrency deposits, there is also the need for an international legal regime to redefine the concept of payment per se, to make the concept more appropriate for the operation of eurocurrency deposits. The nature of the evolution of money and the consequent legal definition of money suggest that an effective tender of payment can be made only with legal tender or cash.33 Thus demand deposits in banks do not constitute money and their use to effect payment does not necessarily discharge a debt. In the case to the use of cash to make payment. This process of making payment is even more important in eurocurrency deposit operations. One of the reasons given by the Commercial Court in London for holding that repayment of the eurodollar deposit had to be made in cash was that the defendant, Bankers Trust Co., had failed to establish the existence of a custom or usage in the market which required payment to be effected by credit transfers and not cash. It is arguable, however, given the fact that eurodollars are not dollars per se and have to be converted into dollars in the country of issue before payment can be made, that it was not necessary for Bankers Trust Co. to establish the existence of such a custom. Nevertheless, the opinion of the Court suggests that, in the absence of an express term, whether a depositor of eurocurrency will be repaid in the country of issue of the currency or in the country in which the eurobank is located will depend on the nature of the course of dealing between the parties and the circumstances of the case. The situation which the decision has created is one of uncertainty. For it is not even clear what kind of course of dealing will make a court conclude that repayment has to take place in the country of issue. It is thus possible to argue that, in the absence of an international legal regime to establish clearly this process of making payment as a custom or practice of the eurocurrency market, it is more likely than not that the precedent set in the case will be followed in subsequent cases of a like nature. Given that this has given rise to a situation of uncertainty, it justifies the need for, and argument in favour of, an international legal regime for the operation of eurocurrency deposits.
B. The Time of Payment
The use of electronic funds transfers in eurocurrency deposit operations also highlights the need for a body of rules to determine the time of the completion of payment and finality of payment in credit transfer operations. Conceptually, payment by the process of credit transfers may be said to take place when the bank of the payee/customer is constituted the debtor or obligor of that payee/customer in place of the payer/debtor, in respect of the amount due. 35 The determination of the time of payment in credit transfers thus involves the determination of the point in time when this substitution takes place.36 The advent of electronic or automated credit transfers has made the determination of the time of payment in non-paper-based credit transfers even more uncertain. This uncertainty has made it difficult for both jurists and academics to extract principles 35 which constitute a consistent body of legal doctrine governing the determination of the time of the completion of payment. Since eurocurrency deposit operations are facilitated primarily by the means of electronic funds transfers, the uncertainty in the common law regime leaves much to be desired. An examination of the cases which have sought to determine the time of the completion of payment in electronic funds transfers reveals that it is unclear if that determination is to be based on:
(1) whether the payment process is "in-house" or not;37 (2) when an internal decision is made to credit the account of the payee/customer and then this decision is acted upon;38 (3) when a credit entry is actually made, as opposed to the mere decision to credit;39 (4) when the payee's bank accepts or receives the payment order, as opposed to making a credit entry;40 (5) whether notice of the credit to the account of the payee is given to the payee;41 and (6) the particular bank practice in question. which will make the funds ultimately available, but the funds are not yet available. Furthermore, as Geva himself observes, the hypothetical positive response test also does not solve the problem of subjecting the payer to the uncertainties of the internal accounting procedures of the payee's bank. This general dilemma of uncertainty and the absence of any "golden thread" running through the jurisprudence and, for that matter, the common law justify the argument in favour of an international legal regime to govern the operation of eurocurrency deposits, including rules with respect to the determination of the time when payment may be said to be completed. Given the volume of international financial transactions which are effected via electronic funds transfers, this need cannot be overemphasised.
One possible approach is to define the time when payment is completed in terms of the acceptance of the payment order by the beneficiary bank for the benefit of the payee. This is a logical development from the nature of credit transfers. Unlike a debit transfer, a credit transfer is initiated by the debtor. This means that it is possible for the originating or paying bank to determine if the sender of the payment order has adequate funds to cover the transfer. In general then, a sending bank is considered to have committed itself to effecting payment as soon as it does an act indicating that it has accepted the payment order of the sender/customer. From this it is possible to argue that the point in time when payment to the payee is completed is as early as when the beneficiary bank does an act suggesting that it has also accepted the payment order on behalf of the payee, sent by the originating bank. The assumption is that the originating bank would not have accepted the payment order of the sender/ customer and effected a corresponding transfer had there been insufficient funds to cover the transfer or if the originating bank had reason to believe the funds to cover it would not be forthcoming. Acceptance of the payment order by the beneficiary bank on behalf of the payee is the approach currently adopted by Article 4A-405(a) of the Uniform Commercial Code as well as the UNCITRAL Model Law to determine the time of the completion of payment. These two legal regimes may therefore be used as a model for any proposed international legal regime for the operation of eurocurrency deposits.
In addition to the need for a body of rules to determine the time of the completion of payment, there is also the need for rules with regard to the associated issue of payment/receiver finality. Receiver or payment finality concerns the time when payment to the payee is regarded as final and consequently irreversible. Under the common law rules on the use of cheques, the decision of a bank to post credit to the account of the payee upon the receipt of a cheque payable to that customer does not imply a credit risk decision on the part of that bank. Credit to the account of the [VOL. 43 customer is in this respect regarded as being conditional and dependent on the availability of funds in the account of the payer to cover the amount of the cheque. But the situation is not that clear in the case of non-paper-based transfers, including electronic funds transfers. It is unclear whether (i) a beneficiary bank may use its own discretion and post provisional credit to the account of a payee upon the receipt of a payment order but prior to the arrival of funds to cover the order, and (ii) the decision to post credit to the account of the customer concerned implies a credit risk decision on the part of the beneficiary bank, that is, it has assumed the risk of non-payment or sender failure. As a corollary of the above, it is also not clear if a beneficiary bank which is not prepared to assume the risk of non-payment has a right to delay the acceptance of a payment order before the receipt of cover or to reject any payment order which is not accompanied by cover. Given that the use of electronic funds transfers plays an indispensable role in the operation of eurocurrency deposits and that the beneficiary bank is in most cases paid through another account maintained on the books of an intermediary bank, the need for clarity with respect to receiver finality cannot be overstated. In this respect, it is relevant to mention that Article 4A-405(c) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides for receiver finality when funds are made available to the payee. Given the indispensable nature of electronic funds transfers to the operation of eurocurrency deposits, the uncertainty in the common law with regard to the time of the completion of payment, as well as receiver finality, justifies the support for an international legal regime for the operation of eurocurrency deposits.
C. The Law which Governs the Eurocurrency Deposit Contract
The proper law of deposit contracts is another common law rule which has been influenced by the cash-orientated definition of money and the consequent linkage between the place where the deposit is maintained and place where it is repaid. Under the common law, since a bank is normally required to repay a deposit at the branch where the account is kept, in the absence of an express choice of law the proper law of the deposit contract is the law of the place where the account is kept or the deposit is maintained.44 This is said to be the place or system of law with which the deposit contract has its closest and most real connection. The proper law rule is therefore also based on the perceived linkage between the place where the deposit is maintained and the place of repayment. 
D. Extraterritoriality and Conflicts of Jurisdiction
Unlike a domestic bank deposit, the nature of the eurocurrency deposit is such that it straddles many jurisdictions. The effect of this is that the eurocurrency deposit is subject to multiple schemes of regulation. The host country of the eurobank, that is, the country in which the eurobank is located, the home country of the eurobank, or the country in which its head office is located, the country which is the domicile of the depositor, and the country whose currency is the subject matter of the eurocurrency deposit contract, may all have legitimate grounds for regulating the relationship between the offshore bank and the customer in question. Legitimate grounds may be said to exist because of the existence of a genuine link between the country seeking to exercise jurisdiction, and the subject matter of the legislation. 48 The result of this is that jurisdictional conflicts are a distinct possibility in the operation of eurocurrency deposits. There are various examples of situations involving jurisdictional conflict which may arise in the operation of eurocurrency deposits. 
Exchange control regulations and jurisdictional conflicts
Freezing orders and jurisdictional conflicts
Jurisdictional conflicts may also arise from the imposition of freezing and blocking orders-by either the home country of the offshore bank or the country of issue--on certain accounts maintained at the offshore branch. Such measures, as seen in the case involving the imposition of the US freeze on Libyan assets, may then conflict with the law of the country in which the offshore bank is located, which may require all banks located in that territory to honour banking contracts.
Discovery orders and jurisdictional conflicts
Jurisdictional conflicts also arise when either the home country of the offshore bank or the domicile of the depositor passes laws which require the offshore branch bank to produce certain documents and information concerning either the eurocurrency deposit account of a customer or the eurocurrency deposit operations of the offshore bank. Such laws give rise to a jurisdictional conflict when they come into conflict with bank secrecy and confidentiality laws of the host country.5" In all these situations involving jurisdictional conflicts, the issue concerns the validity of the extraterritorial effect of laws, that is, whether a country can pass laws which then purport to have effect in the territory of another. Because the common law rules on the operation of bank deposits are territorial in scope, they do not contemplate offshore currency deposits. Consequently, there are no provisions in the common law rules which are aimed at assisting courts to resolve jurisdictional conflicts. Even the rules of the conflict of laws, or private international law, which are called into play when a case involving a foreign element arises, are based on the notion that laws are territorial in scope."5 The common law therefore regulation, any exchange contract in existence which is contrary to the exchange control regulation becomes unenforceable. The practical effect of this provision is that such an exchange control regulation is given extraterritorial effect, and becomes enforceable by the courts of another country. The approach, then, should be not to preclude extraterritoriality, since it is desirable, but, rather, to create a framework of rules which:
(1) provide for extraterritoriality; (2) determine the validity of extraterritoriality; (3) take into consideration the paramount interests of the State seeking to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of territory; and (4) also provide the courts with a method of resolving jurisdictional conflicts. This article argues that the unique nature of the offshore currency deposit justifies the adoption of an approach which is different from the traditional common law lex situs approach as well as the approaches adopted by the US courts. Unlike the operation of deposits in the domestic context, the offshore currency deposit is exposed to an additional sovereign risk. It thus seems reasonable that, in determining the obligations of the banks concerned in the event of the imposition of any restriction, other factors or variables relating to the contractual obligation of the parties, as derived from all the circumstances of the caseincluding the expectation of the parties and the nature of the allocation of risk-should be taken into consideration. To the extent that the traditional common law lex situs and the other approaches used by the courts do not envisage this additional consideration, they are inappropriate for the international context. A better approach-which this article proposes-is one which seeks to take into consideration the nature of the contractual obligation of the parties as derived from all the circumstances of the case.
This approach involves
According to this approach, it is within the expectation of the parties that in consideration of the high interest rates available in the offshore banking market, the parent bank bears the credit or commercial risk while the customer bears the sovereign risk. This basic expectation is a presumption and, consequently, capable of being negated. When faced with a case involving the issue of whether a home office bank is liable for the deposit maintained at an offshore branch, courts should determine if this basic presumption has been modified or varied by the express contractual obligation of the parties. Such an express contractual obligation of the parties, including representations to the effect that the security of the deposit of the customer is guaranteed, represents a contractual allocation of risk. One effective method of expressly and contractually allocating the risk of political or sovereign intervention in the operation of an offshore deposit is for parent banks to make use of master contracts including terms with respect to the allocation of risk. Such master contracts may then be incorporated by deposit contracts used by offshore branches. In the absence of such a contractual allocation of risk, the court should determine if the basic expectation has been modified or varied by an implied contractual obligation as derived from all the circumstances of the case.
In the absence of an international legal regime to provide the framework of rules and guidelines to assist the courts in the determination of home office liability, however, it is unlikely that the uncertainty and confusion which have characterised this aspect of international banking law will immediately cease to be a problem.
F. Characterisation of Legal Relationships in International Funds
Transfers Another grey area with which this article is concerned is the characterisation of the legal relationships involved in the process of international funds transfers. While the common law is quite clear about the existence of an agency relationship between the bank and its customer with regard to the collection of cheques and other negotiable instruments, there is a considerable amount of uncertainty about the characterisation of the legal relationships involved in credit transfers. There is no consensus in judicial circles or the academic community about the nature of the legal doctrine from which the relevant rules to govern credit transfers are to be derived. While one group of scholars argues in favour of the existence of an agency relationship between all participants in the process of credit transfers,69 others contend that this is incorrect."7 For this latter group of people, while the relationship between the sending customer and the originating bank may be characterised in terms of principal and agent respectively, that between the receiving bank and the payee customer is a normal incident of the banker-customer relationship." According to this argument, when a bank receives funds on behalf of its customer it does so as a debtor of the customer in accordance with the rules of the bankercustomer relationship.72 Consequently, such a bank cannot be deemed to be an agent of the customer in that context.
Since the operation of eurocurrency deposits straddles many jurisdictions, it is only reasonable to expect some measure of uniformity in practice as well as judicial interpretation of such practice to promote the integrity of the system. Given the uncertainty in the common law characterisation of the legal relationships involved in credit transfers, however, there is little possibility of achieving uniformity and certainty. This does not augur well for certainty in the operation of eurocurrency deposits, of which international credit transfers constitute an integral part. It is, location of the system of law which governs substance of the obligation. This could include factors such as the system of law which determines the nature of the debtor-creditor relationship between the eurobank and customer, and the incidents of that debtor-creditor relationship.
Sixth, since the eurocurrency deposit is subject to multiple schemes of regulation, the proposed international legal regime must provide for the possibility of extraterritoriality within certain definite circumstances, and also provide a framework of rules to guide the judiciary in the resolution of consequent conflicts of jurisdiction. Such a provision must provide for a two-pronged approach. Courts must determine whether the States seeking to exercise jurisdiction have standing to do so and whether the exercise of jurisdiction in question has been proper. Although a State may have standing to exercise jurisdiction either because of the IMF rules or the existence of a genuine link between the State concerned and the activity, such an exercise of jurisdiction still has to be proper. In this latter respect, the proposed regime should specify conditions which will determine the proper exercise of jurisdiction. This article has argued in favour of the imposition of a direct, foreseeable and substantial effect on the legislating State as a basis for the proper exercise of jurisdiction. It would be appropriate for the international regime to define the prerequisites for satisfying that direct, foreseeable and substantial effect.
Finally, the international legal regime must also deal with the problem of determining the obligations of international banks in the context of national intervention. In this respect, it must provide for those obligations to be determined on the basis of the contractual obligations of the parties, to be determined in turn from all the circumstances of the case. Using this approach, the regime may provide examples of the multiplicity of factors which may determine the contractual obligation of the parties. Such factors may include the expectation of the parties (as inferred from generally accepted market practices, including the availability of higher rates of interest, from express statements made by bank officials, or from other circumstances, including the existence of a private contract between the offshore bank and the customer) and the degree of awareness of the customer about the increased possibility of sovereign risk, based on each customer's nature, a sophisticated customer (such as a bank or other financial institution) being treated differently from an individual.
In addition to these provisions concerning the operation of eurocurrency deposits and interbank placements, it would also be appropriate for the proposed regime to include principles constituting a code of practice for participants in the eurocurrency market. Such a code will be concerned with providing rules to guide the conduct of market participants, such as:
(1) the prompt communication of terms of a deal between a bank and customer or between banks;
